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AI’s  Transformative Social  Impacts and their Determinants
The potential  societal  impacts of artificial  intelligence (AI)  and related technologies
are so vast,  they are often likened to those of past transformative technological
changes such as the industrial  or agricultural  revolutions.  They are also deeply
uncertain,  presenting a wide range of possibilities for good or ill  –  as indeed the
diverse technologies lumped under the term AI are themselves diffuse,  labile,  and
uncertain.  Speculation about AI’s  broad social  impacts ranges from full-on utopia to
dystopia, both in fictional and non-fiction accounts. Narrowing the field of view from
aggregate impacts to particular impacts and their mechanisms,  there is  substantial
(but far from total)  agreement on some – e.g.,  profound disruption of labor markets,
with the prospect of unemployment that is  novel in scale and breadth – but great
uncertainty on others,  even as to sign.  Will  AI concentrate or distribute economic
and political power – and if concentrate, then in whom? Will it make human lives and
societies more diverse or more uniform? Expand or contract individual  liberty?
Enrich or degrade human capabilities? On all  these points,  the range of present
speculation is  vast.
What outcomes actually come about will  depend partly on characteristics of the
technologies,  partly on the social,  economic,  and political  context – what specific
technical  capabilities,  with what attributes,  are developed and deployed, and how
people adjust behavior around the capabilities.  It  is  a basic doctrine of technology
studies to reject technological  determinism: technological  and socio-political  factors
interact,  and to the extent either predominates in shaping outcomes it  tends to be
the social  and political  factors.  The interplay between these underpins the well-
known “Collingridge paradox,” which states a structural  challenge to managing
technology’s societal  impacts1:  early in development,  control  efforts are hindered by
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limited knowledge, because impacts are indeterminate until  a technology is
stabilized,  deployed, and used; while later in development,  control  efforts are
hindered by limited power,  because the same development processes that
determine and clarify impacts also build political  interests in the technology’s
unhindered expansion.
In correctly rejecting naïve or extreme forms of technological determinism, however,
these characterizations are often deployed too starkly and universally. Collingridge’s
paradox of knowledge and control  is  better understood as a persistent tension than
as a categorical statement of impossibility. Moreover, without disparaging the power
of social  context,  technological  processes and artifacts are not infinitely malleable:
particular technologies have characteristics,  which in some cases tend to favor
particular uses,  applications,  or consequences.  Kranzberg’s (slightly whimsical)  first
law of technology aptly captures the tension:  “Technology is  neither good nor bad;
nor is it neutral.”2 It is subject to influence, and that puts responsibility onto humans
to wisely guide its development and application.
AI may be a class of technologies for which serious consideration of the role of
technical  characteristics in shaping impacts is  especially needed, in view of its labile
nature and its potential  for profound societal  disruption.  Two examples from widely
separated parts of present debates about AI impacts illustrate the point.  First,
concerns about impacts of extreme AI advances to general,  beyond-human
intelligence – and related efforts to develop “Friendly” or “Safe” AI,  or align its
objectives with human values (assuming these are known and agreed) – are entirely
concerned with attributes of the technology.  These efforts seek to ensure good
consequences,  or at least avoid the worst ones,  by embedding reliable determinants
of benevolent aims,  prudence, or other virtues into the technical  artifacts
themselves. To the extent this program succeeds – a huge assumption, to be sure – it
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would move concerns about these extreme forms of AI impact out of the social  and
political  domains entirely.
It is widely noted, of course, that focusing predominantly on such hypothetical future
super-AI risks misleading,  by distracting from addressing nearer-term uses and
impacts that are also potentially transformative for good or ill  –  including both the
“now” and the mid-term.3  Technical  characteristics,  even abstracted from social
context,  also matter for these near and medium time horizons – i.e.,  well  before
development of AGI or super-AI – when AI will  clearly have transformative
possibilities but still,  at  least formally,  be under human control.  The importance of
technological  characteristics is  evident even in current AI controversies,  in both
what technical  capacities allow and what they require.  As an example of impacts
driven by what technical  capacities allow, AI-enabled advances in data integration
and surveillance,  especially facial  recognition,  already present significant threats to
privacy and autonomy. These capabilities are being deployed because current actors
find advantage in them, of course – a matter of social  and political  context.  But it  is
the technical  performance characteristics that create these new capabilities and
make them visible.  As an example of impacts driven by technical  requirements,
present machine learning algorithms require training on large labeled datasets.  This
requirement has driven two powerful  effects and points of concern.  It  has steered
many near-term commercial  applications toward decision domains such as criminal
justice and health,  in which huge individual-level  datasets with clearly labeled
outcomes are available,  with little advance consideration of the high personal,  legal,
and societal  stakes – and high costs of error – that are intrinsic to these domains.
And it  has replicated, by some accounts even magnified,  pre-existing biases present
in these training data,  and projected them forward into future decisions.
Our workgroup reflected on the question of AI impacts in broad historical  context:
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in effect,  we took seriously the analogy to past technology-fueled revolutionary
transformations of human society such as the industrial  revolution.  But we did this
with a perspective opposite to much current debate,  considering the prospect for
societal  impacts that are transformative in scale but beneficial  in valence.
Speculations about huge societal  benefits from AI are common, but tend to be
superficial  and conclusory,  often based on speculative gains in single areas such as
medical  care or scientific research.  By contrast,  speculations on AI-driven dystopias
are frequent and attention-getting, often with their causal mechanisms characterized
in some detail.  4
A Historical  Analogy
In our inquiry,  we drew insight and inspiration from a line of commentary on past
societal  transformations that gets insufficient attention in current debates on
technology impacts – despite being a prominent theme in the work of a few
distinguished scholars such as Albert Hirschman and Elizabeth Anderson.5  These
scholars point out that at the time modern liberal  states,  market capitalism, and
associated technological changes were emerging,  these trends were widely heralded
as drivers of political  and economic progress,  relative to aristocratic social
hierarchies,  promising not just greater liberty – one part of the argument that
remains prominent in modern political  discourse – but also increased equality (in
some accounts also fraternity or comity – to complete the revolutionary triad). These
promised and briefly realized happy trends reversed, as technologies of the
industrial  revolution and their economies of scale drove vast accumulations of
capital and separated the previously tight connection between markets and equality.
Progressive reactions from governments (e.g.,  anti-trust) and new organizations (e.g.,
labor unions,  charitable foundations) mitigated these trends to better balance
autonomy, prosperity,  and equality – a balance that current technological  and
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economic trends are disrupting.
Our group aimed to re-open this question in the current context of rapid advances
of AI. Can these transformative capabilities deliver on the old promise of technology
as both liberator and equalizer? Can they do so in a way that is  compatible with
foundational  moral  and constitutional  principles,  and democratic institutions:  e.g.,
freedoms of speech, association,  religion,  and the press;  and private property rights
with markets allocating resources through voluntary transactions,  except insofar as
these implicate external  harms or public values (and as Mill  reminds us,  without
drawing these public bases for concern so broadly as to undermine the basic liberty
presumptions).6  And if  this is  all  possible,  what would it  require:  what are the key
conditions that would mediate the ability of AI to help advance such a happy social
vision?7
In considering this question,  we did not elevate technological  characteristics to the
exclusion of social  and political  context;  but we did consider technical  and political
forms of the question separately.  First,  what technological  characteristics of AI
systems and applications are likely to promote good societal outcomes? And second,
what economic,  social,  and political  conditions – including,  concretely,  what feasible
business models – are likely to promote AI technology developing in these
benevolent directions,  and be sustainable over time?
Promising Directions:  Technological  Characteristics
In considering the technological  part of the question,  we focused on two broad
technical  attributes that we speculate may help direct AI’s  transformative societal
impact toward the good: one related to the form and structure of decision-making,
and one related to the distribution,  scope, and number of separate AI agents.
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Decision-making structure:  Single-valued optimization,  versus robustness and
pluralism?
Virtually all  automated decision systems – modern machine-learning systems and
conventional  algorithms alike – operate by optimizing a single-valued scoring or
objective function.  This is  most obvious in the case of known preferences and
conditions of full  certainty,  but similar approaches are used under uncertainty:
maximizing an expected payoff or expected utility function,  based on specified
probability distributions,  sampling from specified uncertain parameter inputs,  or
data assimilation from concurrent observations.  These approaches all  optimize a
single-valued function relative to a single characterization,  deterministic or
stochastic,  of conditions in the world.
There is an alternative, less unitary approach to decision-making, which initially grew
out of concepts of satisficing,  bounded rationality,  and multi-criteria decision-
making.8  This alternative approach,  one prominent form of which is  called “robust
and adaptive decision-making” (RDM),  seeks decisions that perform acceptably well
over a wide range of possible realizations of uncertainties,  rather than performing
maximally well  under any single specification,  whether deterministic or probabilistic.
RDM has extensive experience in diverse decision application areas.  It  has not been
used in AI or machine learning,  but we conjecture that it  may have powerful
implications,  broadly consistent with the progressive social  values we aim to
advance.
The seed for this hopeful speculation lies in the fact that RDM is not just robust over
alternative realizations of uncertainty about the world:  it  is  also robust to
uncertainty in the decision’s goals or the range of values it  implicates.  RDM thus
holds the potential  to be more pluralistic,  more compatible with both uncertainty
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and diversity of values – and thus,  perhaps,  with more inclusive and more equitable
AI-driven decision-making. We realize that this is hopeful speculation about potential
technical  capabilities and the societal  implications of their application,  not a
demonstrated characteristic of AI systems. But while the capabilities and associated
questions remain largely unexamined, they clearly merit  high-priority investigation.
The Number and Orientation of AI agents:  What actors,  and what aims,  do they
serve?
There is  a wide range of speculation on the number,  deployment scale,  and
objectives of future AI systems, ranging from each person commanding multiple AI
agents for different purposes,  through one integrated AI that does everything for
everyone. Present AI developments consistently show a much narrower pattern,
which is not necessarily well  aligned with broadly distributed societal  benefits.  Most
current efforts and most important recent advances have come from large,  well-
funded organizations:  for-profit  corporations,  free-standing laboratories and
institutes,  and universities,  some surrounded by clusters of small  startup firms,  with
widely varying levels of government financial  support and control  among countries.
The most prominent current deployments of algorithmic decision-making are offered
by private, for-profit firms, many of them in settings where the deploying party has a
dominant position in the relevant interactions:  Amazon toward purchasers and 3rd-
party vendors;  Facebook toward social-media users;  Google toward its service users
and data providers;  Uber toward drivers.  In these settings,  users can observe only a
small  slice of the system’s performance in its interactions with them, but have
virtually no information about its broader operations,  including what it  is  optimizing.
In all  these interactions,  commercial  or not,  the available evidence – plus common
sense – suggest that the systems are optimizing for the interests of the dominant
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actor, taking lesser account of the interests or welfare of the user only as needed to
advance the primary aim – and, moreover,  are doing so in ways that take advantage
of the dominant actor’s market power.
But this structure of relationships is  not a necessary consequence of algorithmic
decision-making or decision-support systems. One can imagine a wide range of other
possibilities for how AI systems are deployed, some of them more compatible with a
reduced concentration of power.  An obvious and widely discussed possibility would
be general-purpose AI assistants serving individual people,  either unitary systems or
integrations of multiple special-purpose systems. Such agents could act as
information source,  advocate,  and negotiator for their clients in multiple
interactions.  They could provide suggestions and recommendations,  manage the
mechanics of transactions,  and bargain on your behalf  in consumption and other
commercial  interactions,  both present ones and new ones it  would enable – e.g.,
renting out your car,  tools,  or other costly assets when you do not need them. They
could play similar roles in financial  and investment decisions,  and in labor-market
participation.  In situations of conflict or interaction with authorities,  they could aid
you in negotiations and advise you on your legal  rights.  They could support and
advise your political  participation,  whether through existing channels such as voting
and candidate support or through new, AI-enabled processes that combine elements
of representative and direct democracy,  such as issue-specific proxy delegation or
other forms of “liquid democracy.”  And they could act as a personal coach,  helping
you make decisions and manage your time in line with your goals and values.  The
biggest challenge in creating such systems – as we discuss below – would be defining
their objectives to reliably align with their user’s welfare and values.
Alternatively,  rather than serving individuals,  AI systems could operate enterprises
or collections of assets,  to perform specified functions or advance specified
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interests aligned with social  good. For example,  AI systems – perhaps self-owned or
self-controlled – might operate businesses or parts thereof such as individual
factories;  apartment buildings or larger-scale collections of housing or other
buildings;  public transit  systems or other infrastructure components;  or specific
functions of government decision-making, in cases where the delegation of authority
and the specification of relevant values to advance are unproblematic.
AI agents could also be deployed at higher levels of aggregation,  to inform or guide
the joint actions of groups of people in pursuit  of their shared interests in some
specific domain – whether commercial,  political,  recreational,  expressive,  religious,
or something else.  Relative to personal AI assistants,  these agents would operate at
a scale that is broader in the people whose interests are served, but narrower in the
range of functions being pursued or interests being advanced.
Finally,  one could imagine AI agents deployed at the level of the entire polity in
some jurisdiction,  centralizing decision-making on state functions in pursuit  of some
legitimate and widely agreed conception of the aggregate social  good. There is  of
course some tension in using AI this way to increase human liberty and agency.  Can
we really claim to advance liberty and agency by centralizing state control? But
these are largely the same tensions as attend state authority guided by humans. The
state is  a strong centralizer of power.  But in liberal  democratic states,  this
centralization serves the interests of order and security,  including displacing other,
less legitimate forms of concentrated power that are likely to arise in the absence of
the state.  And moreover,  liberal  states exercise this power lightly,  so as to enhance
liberty and welfare,  only coercing citizens as needed to pursue legitimate public
purposes.
Considered overall,  this collection of potential  AI deployments might tend to have
Could AI drive transformative social progress? What would this
require?
by: Edward Parson, Robert Lempert, Ben Armstrong, Evan Crothers, Chad DeChant and Nick Novelli
| 10
an hourglass structure. As the scale of deployment moves from individuals to groups,
the functional  scope of the AI narrows to specific aims of particular groups;  then at
the highest level  of jurisdictional  aggregation,  the scope of AI decision-making
returns (or can return) to the comprehensively broad, imperfectly known set of
interests that are the legitimate purview of state authority.
Examples of large-scale social reorganizations that would potentially be feasible with
such a collection of AI agents would include the following:
– Breaking up monopolistic social-media platforms into multiple distinct platforms,
each managing members’ interactions by internally agreed rules and mediating the
interactions between insiders and outsiders.  AI would be used to facilitate such a
breakup by overcoming the incumbent advantage due to network externalities.
This is  already happening in a small  way,  with the growth of new social  media
platforms such as Diaspora and Mastodon with commitments to stronger privacy
protections than present platforms.
– New ride-sharing platforms,  in which AI is  deployed not as an instrument of the
network’s monopoly (or the Uber/Lyft duopoly) over drivers,  but instead
deployed to serve drivers and driver collectives, interacting with multiple counter-
parties (current ride-share companies,  potential  new entrants,  and others),  and
with riders,  who in turn might be interacting with the system through their
personal AI assistants.  AI in such settings could optimize contractual  terms to
maximize shared value,  while also equitably distributing surplus value between
drivers,  riders,  and providers of other factors of production – including paying
returns to capital  and managerial  services,  but on competitive rather than
monopolistic terms.
– A similar but broader labor-force model, not for people providing one service to
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one business (e.g.,  drivers and Uber),  but with AI intermediaries enabling groups
of individuals to come together to offer products and services to the market
without the need for corporate intermediaries.  Such groups could utilize
distributed supply chains, to which they submit opportunities and find others who
wish to join and bid to offer their services.  As in the narrower,  ride-sharing case,
AI agents could optimize contractual  terms,  including provisions for duration and
modification,  based on the preferences of the participating individuals.
–  AI-mediated political  interaction – among citizens,  activists,  politicians,  and
political  parties – to provide more civil  and substantive deliberations,  and more
effective,  informed, and flexible translation of citizen preferences into collective
decisions.  Such systems might aim to provide equal opportunity for political
participation to all  citizens,  to motivate and reward virtue and moderation rather
than vice and extremism, and to be dynamic – able to update,  including updating
collective understanding of what counts as virtue or vice.  In contrast to the
preceding examples, which would replace commercial transactions, this one would
require more manipulation of incentives for individual  behavior in pursuit  of
collective interests of civility,  moderation,  and reasoned debate.  It  could be
designed to reward – with more influence and scope to reach a broad audience –
those who best exhibit  those virtues,  rather than rewarding volume, belligerence,
extreme views,  personal attacks,  skilled manipulation,  or outrage.
– Within this context of AI-mediated political  interactions,  AI could discharge
certain administrative functions of the state,  mitigating the long-standing tension
between expert and democratic control  noted by Weber.  AI’s  exercise of these
functions would be guided by objective functions tuned by democratic
deliberation. Through AI-facilitated direct deliberations or some equivalent quasi-
legislative process,  citizens would define large-scale aims and principles,  set
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parameters for AI objective functions,  then observe the results and iteratively
adjust those parameters to steer toward a preferred balance of multiple societal
aims.  Such an administrative AI would in effect act like regulatory agencies under
present administrative law, but with more explicit  and more consistent parsing of
authority between high-level democratic goal-setting and technically skilled
implementation.
Realizing any of these alternative models of AI deployment would pose major
challenges,  which include significant technological  elements even though they are
not exclusively technological  in character.  A central  challenge,  perhaps the
fundamental one, is appropriately defining the AI’s objective function. Even with the
shift  toward a more robust and pluralistic approach as discussed above, this would
imply three additional  subtle and related requirements.
First,  in any application the AI must act as a faithful  agent of its intended
beneficiary,  whether this is  an individual  or a group of any size.  The AI pursues its
beneficiaries’  values and interests – not the interests of its maker,  not even when it
must resolve ambiguities or indeterminacies in its understanding of its beneficiaries’
values. This would represent a major departure from presently deployed AI systems,
including those that are approaching the role of general-purpose personal assistants.
These are developed by firms with interests in the user’s behavior,  and thus in
manipulating that behavior or harvesting the user’s information – even if  that
manipulation may be subtle and the systems seem to optimize for the user’s
preferences. These systems are also developed in the context of various commercial
and state interests in creating over-rides or back doors,  in order to allow
surveillance and control  contrary to the user’s interests.
Even assuming this first  condition is  met,  so the decision scales are not tilted to
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favor the maker’s interests,  systems interacting with individuals face a second
challenge of understanding the determinants of the user’s true values,  interests,  or
welfare,  as distinct from their immediate impulses or desires.  This is  hard to define,
imperfectly inferable from observed behavior,  prone to error,  and in need of
continual  adjustment and updating.  Like a wise parent or a skilled life coach,  such
systems would nudge the user’s choices in directions judged likely to be compatible
with their long-term flourishing – with the key difference from parenting (although
not from coaching) that the ultimate authority in the relationship lies with the user.
This would require a delicate balance, by which the system pushes against immediate
preferences and desires when these appear to be at odds with the client’s values or
long-term interests. But to do this, the AI assistant must build a model of the client’s
values and long-term interests,  based on data available to it.  The system will  thus
sometimes make mistakes,  and so will  need to recognize uncertainty,  make some of
its recommendations tentative,  and sometimes consult  and ask for help – while also
still  using its present,  uncertain knowledge to configure the choice space in ways
likely to tend to beneficial  outcomes.  There will  thus be a core design tension,
between allowing human over-ride of AI recommendations and putting some degree
of burden or barrier in front of instant,  effortless,  or wholesale over-ride.
A related but even sharper tension will  be present in the case of people with
destructive,  malicious,  or criminal  preferences.  Even liberal  states do not honor or
aim to fulfill  the preferences of every citizen,  independent of collectively exercised
moral  judgments.  One can readily imagine a sexual predator or other criminal
wanting their AI agent to help identify victims,  assess the threat of detection or
apprehension,  manipulate victims to not resist or not report,  or pursue other clearly
nefarious aims.  One problem here is  defining the boundaries of permissible
preferences – a challenge similar but not identical  to that in non-AI contexts of
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defining the boundaries of criminal  or civil  wrongdoing – except that,  as in so many
domains,  making scoring or objective functions explicit  can be troublesome in cases
where maintaining ambiguity provides needed social  cohesion or moral  comfort.
Even assuming appropriate definition of the boundaries of permissible user
preferences,  a related design problem will  be protecting AI systems against hacking
or manipulation to enable such uses – either by intentionally disabling the AI’s
“conscience” functions,  or by misrepresenting intentions in planning or multi-step
execution of bad acts.  We want individual  AI agents that can distinguish their user’s
seeking an out-of-the-way place for a quiet picnic,  or to carry out a murder.
Additional  requirements and challenges would apply to AI agents managing
enterprises or assets:  e.g.,  self-directed AI corporations,  housing developments,  or
transit  systems. First,  should the substantive decision scope of such agents be
narrowly circumscribed and fixed? This raises issues analogous to those in current
law regarding charities or other non-profit  organizations seeking to change their
original  missions.  Narrow and fixed goals would risk restricting behavior so the AI
cannot respond appropriately to changed knowledge and conditions; but changeable
goals risks letting the AI transit  system decide to go into the adult  film business
instead – whether because it  judges the change would make more money,  generate
more happiness,  or better promote peace and order.  Second, can behavior be
constrained to be legal  and ethical  in a way that is  sufficiently clearly defined and
does not put such enterprises at competitive disadvantage relative to others playing
by looser rules? Third,  can objectives be tuned to not accumulate rents in excess of
the costs of all  factors of production? If  so,  these enterprises might be able to out-
compete others that are pursuing and taking rents,  and so form the kernel of a
gradual erosion of concentrated economic power – unless the others are pursuing an
Amazon strategy,  taking losses for a long time to secure a dominant market position
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thereafter. Alternatively, if rents do accrue – as they sometimes will – what should be
done with these? Presumably they should not be retained within the individual
enterprise,  but instead distributed in line with the system’s large-scale aims.  But
does this mean to the Treasury? Or perhaps to a pool dedicated to financing the
capital  needs of the broad “social-progress-through-AI” enterprise,  as discussed
below? Finally,  if  these bodies sometimes go bankrupt – as seems likely,  given the
constraints imposed on them – how can one ensure that they quietly accept this fate,
and what should happen to their assets when they do? As UCLA law professor Dan
Bussell  argues in a forthcoming paper,  AI enterprises may need a new kind of
bankruptcy court.
When AI systems are deployed to serve multiple people,  to inform people’s
interactions with each other or advance group interests and values,  additional
challenges and design tensions will  arise.  These problems are similar,  whether the
structural  approach to decisions involves collective decision-making or bargaining
among individuals’  AI agents,  or some separate AI agents operating at a higher,
collective scope of authority.  The challenges all  follow from a basic fact:  in any
decision situation involving multiple people,  there are multiple measures of welfare.
These are sometimes aligned, but they can also exhibit  disagreements,  rivalrous
claims on the same resources,  collective-action problems, or other tensions.  Most
often,  there is  some mixture of aligned and opposing interests.  In such situations,
even formal game-theoretic outcomes can be ambiguous due to the existence of
multiple Nash equilibria.  There can also be inferior collective outcomes from
individual choices that are locally advantageous,  or inequitable outcomes in
distributive negotiations that favor the most aggressive bargaining tactics.
Even assuming AI agents reflect individual  values well,  guiding or informing such
multi-person interactions presents several  additional  design requirements.  The
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systems would need to identify and avoid collectively inferior outcomes – even if
they are equilibria – by providing coordinated nudges to steer parties toward
collectively superior outcomes. They would need to apply the same gentle resistance
against self-destructive impulses as at the individual  level,  now with the added
requirement to steer groups against choices driven by collective-level pathologies
such as envy,  malice,  hostile stereotypes,  or escalation dynamics and other
entrapment mechanisms. And they would need to address the problem of aggressive
bargaining behavior,  recognizing that this often succeeds at securing favorable one-
time outcomes in divide-the-pie negotiations,  at the cost of inferior collective
outcomes and damaged relationships.  The systems would have to both refrain from
such behavior on behalf  of individuals,  and not reward it  in determining collective
outcomes.  These requirements and the associated bargaining pathologies are best
understood in commercial  interactions,  but they have close analogies in other
domains.  A salient current example is  maintaining civil  discourse,  in politics and
online,  in the presence of powerful  attention-getting advantages in being colorful,
extreme, and uncivil  –  a domain in which a few experiments have shown that AI
agents can make the problem worse,  if  they are trained on the actual  content of
current discourse.
Achieving these aims would require that an AI system managing collective decision
outcomes would need both the knowledge to identify collectively superior and
inferior outcomes,  and the ability to apply defensible principles for fair  division of
surpluses and resolution of conflicting preferences.  If  collective decisions are
handled by collectively accountable AI agents,  these would need to reliably observe
the preferences and values of all  affected people,  plus relevant information about
the world that shapes the set of feasible outcomes – a tall order. On the other hand,
if  collective decisions are handled by interactions among individual  AI agents – each
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presumably with better information about its own user’s preferences and values —
then the individual agents’ bargaining behavior must be subject to constraints guided
by collective welfare:  e.g.,  seeking to maximize joint gains;  not pursuing these by
shifting negative externalities onto others not present in the interaction; fair dealing
with each other,  in both process and substance; and refraining from destructive
bargaining tactics even when these promise a one-time advantage.
Some form of regulation at the collective level appears to be needed, but defining
(and automating) precise rules will  pose severe challenges.  In different decision
domains,  the needed functions might be characterized as mediator-arbitrators,
content moderators,  or judges.  Should these be AIs,  humans,  or machine-human
partnerships? How can these processes be made robust against sophisticated
attempts to capture them for partisan advantage? If  the aim of these is  to advance
widely (but perhaps not universally)  held collective values,  how broadly should they
be binding in domains such as political  discourse that implicate free speech and
other liberty values? And to the extent these processes supplant human decision-
making – which traditionally advances collective aims by some combination of formal
regulation and propagation and maintenance of social  norms – might widespread
assumption of these duties by AI risk atrophy of the associated skills,  sense of duty,
and other virtues in humans?
Promising Directions:  Social,  Political,  and Strategic Issues
Summarizing the above, the technical  AI characteristics we speculate likely to be
associated with good societal  impacts include the following:
– AI does not irreversibly alienate individual  human agency in any domain;
– AI objective functions are tentative and pluralistic,  along the lines of RDM,
rather than single-minded and dogmatic;  they admit multiple possibilities in
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outcomes and values, recognize limits to their knowledge of these, and know when
and how to ask for additional  information or guidance;
– AI performance is monitored and adjusted over time with significant input from
people,  acting alone for their personal AI’s  or in democratic,  deliberative groups
for AIs with collective or society-wide responsibilities;
– AI agents must be are trustworthy in all respects. Individual AI agents pursue the
interests of their client rather than any developer or vendor;  and they pursue the
true,  long-term interests and values of their client,  via recommendations,  nudges,
and exhortations – acting like a wise parent or friend. AI agents acting,  mediating,
or arbitrating on behalf  of collections of people follow principles of fair  dealing
and equitable distribution of surpluses among participating parties,  and
incorporate interests of other actors or values outside the participating parties
only insofar as these represent real  externalities.
Having speculatively identified these desirable technical  characteristics of AI
systems, we then asked how such technical  systems might be developed, deployed,
scaled,  and sustained over time. These are questions of political  and economic
strategy.  The proposed innovations – in addition to being uncertain and weakly
characterized – would represent attacks on existing concentrations of wealth and
power and the rents that sustain these.  There are thus likely to face,  at a minimum,
challenges in securing the resources they need to be created, established, grow, and
sustain;  and more likely,  will  face determined and strategically sophisticated
opposition.
Getting a Start:
In this situation,  the first  challenge will  be getting such systems developed and
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deployed. What this requires will  depend on the details  of the relevant systems and
the inputs needed to produce them – the production function for AI capabilities – all
aspects of which are deeply uncertain.
On this,  an initial  issue to consider is  whether systems with the desired
characteristics can be reliably developed by modifying other systems that were
developed by and for current commercial  actors – assuming these can be legally
acquired.  If  they can to some degree,  then the key questions are,  first,  trust and
reliability – how can we verifiably assure that the systems so ported do not sneakily
import the interests of their developers – and second, what additional resources and
inputs are needed to modify systems and deploy them for their new purposes?
At best,  the desired systems would need training procedures and data for their
newly targeted uses,  related to the individual  or collective values to be served. This
might be cheap and easy;  it  might be expensive and difficult;  or it  might be
impossible,  at least initially,  because data relevant to the newly targeted uses and
goals might not exist.  Oddly,  there is  likely to be more and better data available to
serve vendors’  commercial  interests – which depend on observable matters such as
attention,  time spent,  and purchasing and other behavior – than is  available to serve
individual and collective values. Data presents other challenges as well, including the
possibility that no truly general-application AI can be developed given jurisdictional
divisions and restrictions on data access and use; and the present dependence of AI
progress on a huge volume of labeled data,  which in turn depends on a huge,  low-
wage workforce doing this essential  step.
The less fortunate case would be that new systems with the desired characteristics
must be developed from scratch.  In this case,  the same data concerns identified
above would still  apply.  But there would also be a greater need for other inputs,  for
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initial  system development and deployment and for continuing maintenance,
adaptation,  and upgrades.  These needs are probably similar for key advances in
multiple areas of AI development,  independent of the specific form of objective or
the scope of application.  In addition to suitable training data,  these include highly
skilled technical  personnel;  hardware-based computing power;  and capital  –  lots of
capital  judging from present industry structure,  although this could change.
The premise of the new AI developments we seek is that,  unlike the present system,
successful  development of useful  capabilities,  even achieving crucial  technical
advances,  will  not create fabulous wealth for developers or their employees,
collaborators,  or investors.  So how can the needed developments be effectively
motivated? The recent case of OpenAI reconstituting itself  as a for-profit
corporation because it  could not raise enough capital  as a not-for-profit  AI
developer provides a germane cautionary example.
Our discussions identified several  promising elements of potential  development
models.  The first  concerns identifying early targets,  current products or present or
potential  uses to displace.  Promising targets might include products that are now
gathering the largest rents,  or that are targets of the strongest current objections
and political  threats,  or for some other reason are ripe for raiding.  Other promising
factors would include consumers’  willingness to incur a little inconvenience from
switching costs;  perhaps also a preference for local  providers and small-scale
relationships.  The aim would be to target early penetration there,  with alternative
products that distribute the rents or other values to their users,  not the vendors.
The second element is  assembling and mobilizing the needed factors of production.
On this, the initiative could start with crowd-sourcing, philanthropy, or other sources
of capital  motivated by social  goal  rather than profit  –  although these sources are
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usually much smaller than investment-motivated capital.  An open-source
development model may hold advantages,  including facilitating engagement of top
technical  talent and mobilizing utopian and anarchic strains within the technical
community.  Such an initiative would provide an opportunity to probe the depth and
sincerity of the revolts by high-tech workers against narrow conceptions of their
employers’  self-interest,  inviting them to put their money and skills  where their
mouths are.
All  aspects of this strategy – including,  crucially,  attracting capital  and pro bono
talent – would benefit  from well-branded, highly attractive initial  projects:  e.g.,  the
faithful  individual  AI helper,  or the AI facilitator of civil  political  discussion and
collective action (both of which may represent compellingly attractive aspirations,
but would clearly need better names).
Not all  philanthropy pursues aims that are clearly benign and universally agreed, of
course.  Sometimes it  makes sense to worry about limited or partisan social
objectives in philanthropy:  For example,  don’t  solicit  support for your climate-
change campaign from the Koch Foundation.  But this concern might be less serious
for AI than in more established policy areas with well-known lines of political alliance
and opposition. Libertarian philanthropists – yes, perhaps even the Koch Foundation
– may well  support the aim of empowering individual  liberty and agency with
individual-level AI agents. As for group-level AI agents advising different decisions to
advance different aims,  these will  be multiple overlapping agents operating in a
pluralistic setting,  so the risks of capture by any limited or partisan view of the
public interest may be less severe.
Persisting and Scaling:
Once socially beneficial AI capabilities are deployed, they still need mechanisms and
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resources to persist, scale, and sustain their position. Moreover, they must do this in
a way that maintains their alignment with citizen and public values and remains
attractive to users – even once the initial  novelty of the initiative has passed, with
possible decline in the enthusiasm of pioneer supporters and developers.  The initial
sources of capacity may not be enough to persist  under these conditions,  or to
overcome the sustained advantage of strategically sophisticated and ruthlessly self-
interested incumbents,  who might respond by deploying cheap attractive systems as
loss-leaders to secure longer-term advantage.  The enterprise will  need to maintain
needed access to technical expertise and capital,  whether from associated revenues
or from investors.
Some present business models,  such as relying on advertising,  clearly appear not to
be viable for this project,  but several others appear plausible.  One possibility would
be subscription or purchase,  although the implications of alternative ownership
models and their compatibility with the large-scale aims – do I  purchase my AI
assistant and related supporting systems or rent them, and from whom – would
require careful  thought.  If  the services provided by AI systems include facilitating
transactions or cooperative activity with exchange of money, the system could take a
fee to cover development costs,  provided the fee is perceived as reasonable and its
basis fully disclosed. Another possibility would be a co-operative enterprise model.
These organizations reach large scale in some jurisdictions with strong historical
traditions of self-organized cooperative activity and supportive policy environments.
There might be bootstrapping possibilities,  based upon the use of AI.  Early AI’s
might be developed to help identify targets and strategies for subsequent
expansion.  They might provide information,  services,  and access to resources that
have traditionally been provided by venture capitalists or other early-stage private
investors.  They might help identify points in current supply chains or production
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models that are rigid or constrained, or where market power is  hindering rapid
development and deployment.
Another novel approach might be to turn the widely denounced short-termism of
capital  markets to advantage,  by deploying AI agents that pre-commit to change
their behavior over time. An AI raider could initially pursue maximum short-term
competitive advantage,  but with a binding commitment to change course in the
future.  If  its  short-term competitive advantage is based on strong IP,  for example,
the commitment might be to unlimited free licensing after the initial  period expires.
A policy change to support this might be a new form of IP, based on modifying either
patent or copyright,  that combines highly advantageous short-term protections with
an iron-clad,  non-contestable commitment to expiry and full  release to the public
domain thereafter.
As the endeavor succeeds and grows,  it  will  encounter changes in its strategic and
competitive conditions.  Some of these will  work to its benefit:  for example,  open
networked organizations pursuing broadly public aims are likely to have an easier
time pooling and sharing data than rivalrous commercial  organizations.  Other
changes will  represent new challenges that increase costs or other barriers.  As the
new systems grow to mediate decisions that channel large sums of money,  they will
attract hackers and others interested in subverting them, and will  have to develop
robust security protections.  Stringent open-source review can provide part of the
needed protection,  but some risk will  remain.  It  will  also be necessary to be vigilant
about the interests of continuing sources of finance: any source motivated by
financial  return will  present ongoing risks of subtle distortions of aims,  and the
associated prospect of simply replacing old centers of concentrated power by new
ones just as determined to sustain their position.
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Finally,  if  the endeavor succeeds so well  that some combination of individual  AI
assistants,  autonomous AI enterprises,  and AI-mediated collective interactions – all
with the desired characteristics – becomes the dominant model for societal
deployment of AI,  it  will  be necessary to grapple with the question of innovation.
Current law and policy assume that the main incentive to innovate comes from the
pecuniary motive of earning rents,  from the innovations themselves and from IP
protection around them. With AI agents eschewing most or all  of the rents that
provide enormous financial  rewards to present market actors,  where will  the
motivation and resources to support innovation come from? Several  alternatives
might be possible.  Innovation might still  come from people,  businesses,  or other
organizations,  including AI-facilitated innovation,  stimulated by some combination of
the pecuniary rewards that remain under the new model (which will  be smaller than
under the present system, but probably not negligible),  plus intrinsic motivation to
innovate and create – which the present system largely overlooks. AI agents might be
able to fully take over the huge volume of prosaic,  small-scale innovations now done
for profit  in enterprises seeking IP assets – many of small  or questionable merit.  AI
agents could take over the pedestrian activities of searching through current
technologies,  patents,  and scientific publications that power much such innovative
activity,  but do so with better information and processing capability and with
objectives better aligned with the broad public interest – and with results placed in
the public domain for free further exploitation.  For larger-scale scientific,
technological, artistic, and social innovation, intrinsic motivations have long been the
dominant driver and it  is  reasonable to expect they will  still  be present in the new
world.  Indeed, they might be effectively aided by AI support tools.
Challenges,  next steps:
The technological-political  program of societal  transformation we sketch here is
Could AI drive transformative social progress? What would this
require?
by: Edward Parson, Robert Lempert, Ben Armstrong, Evan Crothers, Chad DeChant and Nick Novelli
| 25
bold,  under-specified,  and incomplete.  It  can be viewed as an attempt to update
Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals,  Scott’s  Weapons of the Weak,  and the Ethical  hacking
movement,  for a new technological  environment of greatly increased power for
autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. It is bold in that we are proposing a new
technological  model of AI and its deployment that opposes the interests of present
dominant incumbents – both private-sector actors whose revenues and business
models would be threatened, and government institutions that would hold different
and less extensive and exclusive as some decision authority shifts to networks of
citizens and autonomous decision-making systems. It  is  essential  not to be naïve
about how large the barriers to entry are,  or about the determination and resources
of incumbents seeking to strangle the new model in its crib.  The new model also
opposes certain structural  characteristics in the economy that tend to favor scale,
and thus centralization.  These include technical  factors such as economies of scale
and network externalities that are strongly shaped by characteristics of production
technologies; and factors more institutional and political in origin, such as fixed costs
from regulatory obligations advancing various public values such as environment
health and safety,  consumer protection,  etc.
The new model is  under-specified,  both in its technical  and its political/strategic
dimensions.  Technically,  we sketch a couple of salient system characteristics that
appear likely to push in the desired direction,  but the devil  is  in the details.  A wide
range of systems and design approaches is  now being pursued and developed in
parallel,  with capabilities – depending on multiple factors in the systems and their
contexts – that might favor or oppose liberty,  privacy,  agency,  and equality.  Even
current developments have had a mix of centralizing and decentralizing effects,
empowering many distributed activities even as they create great new centers of
wealth and power,  including new forms of power not yet exploited or even well
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understood.
As a strategy to move toward this vision, we have identified a few possible pathways
to pursue it  through private action.  But it  is  also worth asking whether appropriate
government policies would be necessary or helpful,  and if  so,  what form. Possible
points of leverage might include data ownership policies such as clear conferral  of
data property rights on individuals,  or limits on concentrated holding of data;  limits
on or new forms of IP; or more expansive definition and robust enforcement of anti-
trust policies.  To the extent the desired transformation does require public policy,
one might also consider which jurisdictions would be most promising to seek an early
strategic foothold.  Perhaps the social  democracies of Europe, which are already
leaders in data and privacy policies? Or perhaps major developing countries with
strong technological  capacity – who would have the advantage of large domestic
markets for early scaling,  but might also be ambivalent toward the leveling ambition,
depending whether leveling is  construed as between countries (in which case they
would presumably be keen advocates) or within countries (in which case, maybe not).
In this global context,  one must also consider risks posed by opportunistic
geopolitical  adversaries,  including the possibility of surreptitious early support for
the development of the new systems coupled with efforts to bias or undermine its
aims – although this threat might become less salient over time if  one consequence
of the spread of the new systems is a decrease in international  rivalries.
Finally,  the proposed new model is  incomplete.  It  is  unlikely to address all  impacts
and social  disruptions caused by rapid advances in AI.  In particular,  we can’t
necessarily expect it  to avoid large-scale displacement of livelihoods by AI.  It  might,
however,  make mass unemployment less individually and socially destructive,
perhaps even make it  desirable.  If  leveling of power implies different bases for
distribution of economic output,  no longer coupled to employment,  then loss of
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employment might cease to be catastrophic.  This might seem inconceivable,  but it
could be analogous to the treatment of health insurance across nations:  in the
United States it  is  tightly coupled to employment and thus highly unequally
distributed, while in all  other advanced democracies it  is  uncoupled from
employment and more equally distributed. It  is  even possible that mass
unemployment – not under present social  organization,  but in a levelers world –
could be profoundly liberating,  enabling people to work,  individually or
cooperatively,  on endeavors they value that are not necessarily related to the
production of material  goods and services.  As AI facilitates efficient production,  it
could also facilitate effective pursuit  of these other aims.
In closing,  AI is  likely to have huge,  transformative societal  impacts,  for good or ill,
but present patterns of development and deployment suggest that small  “AI for
good” movements are likely to be overwhelmed by massive developments that serve
concentrated commercial,  political,  and strategic interests.  With such labile
technology and such potentially vast impacts,  the possibilities for positive
transformative change are real,  but highly uncertain in their detailed requirements
and pathways – and are not being pursued with resources commensurate with their
importance,  or with the resources directed to systems serving private or rivalrous
advantage.  With such huge stakes,  it  is  clearly worth pursuing even ill-defined and
speculative investigations of how to effectively shift  the balance toward the good.
We have identified a few possibilities that seem promising,  but we fully realize that
these are the output of just two days of discussions and are speculative, incomplete,
and under-specified.  Yet despite all  the challenges,  further pursuit  of these
questions,  drawing on more breadth of relevant expertise,  is  a high and urgent
priority.
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